History’s Moral Turn

George Cotkin

‘‘Morality is a subject that interests us above all others,’’ wrote David
Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740).1 While such a concern with
morality has long been evident, each generation needs to revisit its pre
sumptions and language about it. Few would, I suspect, doubt that our age
is marked by especially deep moral ﬁssures and challenges, especially since
earlier presumptions about truth and objectivity have come under sustained
and sometimes withering analysis. At present, we seem to be stuck on ei
ther/or choices, riveted to a hard wall of morality—hence the vituperative
and endless debates on reproductive rights, gay marriage, afﬁrmative ac
tion, and capital punishment. In many cases, morality is worn too proudly,
as a means of avoiding serious thought. It intrudes everywhere in this man
ner: from much contested attempts to display the Ten Commandments in
courthouses and public spaces to invocations of abstinence for control of
sexually transmitted diseases. President George W. Bush has regularly in
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tions and terrorists.2 Books spin off the presses suggesting how Jesus would
act in certain situations. Yet, serious scholars also examine questions such
as how we can live ‘‘a moral life amidst uncertainty and danger’’ and why
is it that we act inhumanely.3
Historians can play an important role in deepening and directing this
moral turn, in moving us away from simplicity to complexity, from rhetori
cal heat into cool compassion. Moral philosophers naturally involve them
selves in the controversial moral issues of the day, and they increasingly use
historical examples to illustrate and support their analyses. Their conceptu
alizations are often deep, but their historical excavations are commonly
shallow. Historians are better able to dig out gems of fact in their glittering
nuance. Historians can, and are at present beginning, to beneﬁt from ac
quaintance with how philosophers employ and problematize various con
cepts—intentionality, virtue, character, moral luck, action, and Just War.
Moral history, as I conceive it, is valuable precisely because it troubles is
sues. The moral turn is less about imposing our moral and political judg
ments on historical events and ﬁgures. It looks at historical agents and
events to warn us that human motivation is complex and confusing, open
and constrained. Morality becomes a process of thinking rather than a pre
digested set of answers. In a time when our politicians and students rest too
comfortably in certitude, history’s moral turn may help create productive
confusion, a willingness to recognize that behind all of our moral choices—
not to mention choices made in the past—lurks paradox, tragedy, and
irony. Understanding, as Kant once put it, is ‘‘burdened by questions.’’4
For Bush’s statements on evil, see: http://irregulartimes.com/evilwar.html. Also, Richard
J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: the Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11 (Mal
den, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005); Peter Singer, The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics
of George W. Bush (New York: Dutton, 2004), 209–210. On Ronald Reagan’s use of the
term ‘‘Evil Empire,’’ see John Patrick Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the
Making of History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2007), 35–37.
3
Amazon.com has a score of books along these lines published in the last few years,
dealing not only with what Jesus would do morally, but what he would eat and how he
would exercise! Recent works by academics on morality for everyday life are Arthur
Kleinman, What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life Amidst Uncertainty and Danger
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Jacob Needleman, Why Can’t We Be
Good? (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2007).
4
Kant, ‘‘Preface to the First Edition,’’ Critique of Pure Reason trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 7. The language in this paragraph suggests
the worldview of the New York intellectuals. Although concerned with the ‘‘moral imagi
nation’’ and its permutations, they failed to trouble their own assumptions about Cold
War liberalism. See Neil Jumonville, Critical Crossings: New York Intellectuals in Post
war America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
2
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In moving to consider history in explicit dialogue with moral issues
and philosophical conceptions, historians should be catholic in their ap
proach. The point of the conversation is to arrange a happy marriage be
tween historical narrative and analysis with philosophical methods and
questions. Historians need not draw only from the most obvious philosoph
ical sources—Kantian notions of right (as in a duty or obligation) or utili
tarianism’s emphasis (as a calculation of claims) on the greatest good.
Instead, they should follow those philosophers that purposefully steer away
from these well-traveled waterways to open us up to a sea of moral ques
tions—how do we think about issues of justice? What does it mean to be
concerned with the dignity of others? What is it that makes a life meaning
ful? Can virtue condition us to face contingency?
Many in the profession, often with good reasons, react negatively when
explicit moralizing, or discussion of moral problems, appears in a historical
text. Armed with social scientiﬁc objectivity and methods, historians since
the late nineteenth-century have generally eschewed the language of morals,
and they have presumably avoided imposing explicit moral judgments of
right and wrong on dead actors and past events. Morality, too, has been
associated with the unsavory connotations of Sunday school didacticism,
abstract applications of rules, or fundamentalist preaching. Finally, the
danger of imposing moral judgments resounds with the presentist problem
of reading our own moral values upon those of an earlier age, thus demean
ing the morality of historical ﬁgures and suggesting that ours resides in a
higher rent district. Historians, by and large, prefer to follow the dictates
laid down by Herbert Butterﬁeld, E. H. Carr, and Henry Steele Commager
to immunize themselves against morality in the pages of their professional
work. It is the height of absurdity and ‘‘arrogance,’’ Commager bellowed,
for historians to render moral judgments in their work; when they do, they
confuse themselves with God.5
Henry Steele Commager, ‘‘Should Historians Sit in Judgment?’’ in Search for a Usable
Past (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 316, 317. Also, Commager, The Nature and
Study of History (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1965), 61. Herbert Butter
ﬁeld, ‘‘Moral Judgments in History,’’ in History and Human Relations (London: Collins,
1951), 101–30; Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage Books,
1961), 94–112. In the same vein, Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft trans. Peter Putnam
(New York: Vintage, 1953), 138–44; David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies:
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 78–81. Also,
Michael Bentley, ‘‘Hebert Butterﬁeld and the Ethics of Historiography,’’ History and The
ory 44 (2005): 55–71. For a good overview, see Richard T. Vann, ‘‘Historians and Moral
Evaluations,’’ History and Theory 43 (2004): 3–30. For a contrary view, see Isaiah Berlin,
Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). On the historian as
5
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A strong animus remains in the profession against moral history.
Moral history seems too beholden to claims that are foundational, hence
resistant or exempt from historical facts and change. Or it places the histo
rian in a position that s/he should not occupy. Perhaps the fullest statement
of this position comes from historian Richard J. Evans. In his writings
about the practice of history, and in his book about the work of Holocaust
denier David Irving, he has argued that history can be objective. Evans
claims that at least some works of history, as in the case of Irving, are
unfair to the facts and consistent in manipulation of data. But historians, he
suggests, are in a danger zone when they wander from their own academic
pastures. Listen to Evans’ claim: ‘‘Historians are simply not trained to make
moral judgments of ﬁndings of guilt and innocence; they have no experience
in these things.’’6 Yet Evans evaluated carefully the historical claims made
by Irving, while appearing in a London court of law, and he pointed out
the moral imperative to truth and objectivity in the practice of history.
If, on the one side, you have antagonism from historians against histo
rians engaging in moral activities, then on the other side you have the histo
rians claiming that they always have been, and still are, engaged in moral
examination of issues.7 Historians certainly confront moral and political
questions in their work. Most historians when writing about the past pre
sume that lessons can be garnered for the present. Sometimes they are ex
plicit about this, sometimes not. Indeed, entire ﬁelds of inquiry—ranging
from African-American to labor to women’s history—at least at their onset,
carried an implicit moral or political agenda. But such attention is often
under-theorized, inexplicit, and anchored in certitude about what was or
ought to be. It is designed to resolve problems, to give us answers in con
crete. This is useful in many circumstances, but it is not the same as the
challenges invoked by the moral turn, which are concerned with evoking
complexity and opening up moral issues and concerns.
The second part of this ‘‘we have always been doing it’’ argument is
that historians are engaged with morality because it is embedded within
judge, see Bruce Kuklick, ‘‘The Mind of the Historian,’’ History and Theory 18 (1969),
esp. 319–320.
6
Richard J. Evans, ‘‘History, Memory, and the Law: the Historian as Expert Witness,’’
History and Theory 41 (2002): 330. On Evans as, in effect, a witness and judge, see Lying
About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and The David Irving Trial (New York: Basic Books,
2002).
7
John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 122, 125–28.
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the texture of our historical arguments and practices. Historians seek to
understand, for example, how slaveholders organized their worldviews or
how slaves maintained agency under horrible conditions, or how gender
codes have been imposed and transformed. In so doing, their historical
work captures how moral values were experienced, molded, and exercised
in the past. Historians’ work also places upon the past its own presump
tions of how things might have been, of what was right and wrong, neces
sary or situational. Such concerns are, of course, moral.8 And they need not
run roughshod over objectivity or our striving for impartiality. As historian
Thomas L. Haskell tells us, objectivity does not mean neutrality—
historians can, and often do, take strong interpretive stances (which are
always implicitly tinged with moral assumptions) without compromising
their objectivity in research.9
Historians encounter the past through language and presumptions. In
1954, Isaiah Berlin claimed that ‘‘our historical language—the words and
thoughts with which we attempt to reﬂect about or describe past events and
persons ‘‘is rife with moral presumptions and judgments, as well it should
be.10 In a sense, Berlin anticipated aspects of postmodern notions of the
narrative nature of history. For Hayden White, historians by their emplot
ment of research materials into a meta-narrative, in effect, construct a
moral universe. ‘‘Could we ever narrativize without moralizing?’’ asks
White. His conclusion is a clear, no.11 Thus historians write moral tales,
albeit more or less consciously. Moreover, in the view of various theorists,
the adherence of practicing historians to professional codes of ethics—what
belongs and does not belong in a text, the etiquette of citation, professional
standards, and much more—constitutes as well a moral stance—one that is
Thomas L. Haskell, ‘‘Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility,’’
American Historical Review 90 (1985), 339–61, 547–65; Karen Halttunen, ‘‘Humanitar
ianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture,’’ American Historical
Review 100 (1995): 303–34.
9
Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Bal
timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 145ff. Also, Allan Megill, Rethinking
Objectivity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).
10
Berlin, Historical Inevitability, 57.
11
Hayden White, ‘‘Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,’’ in The Content of Form:
Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni
versity Press, 1987), 25. Also, White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
White softens his views in ‘‘Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,’’ in Probing
the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution, ed. Saul Friedlander (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 37–53.
8
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invariably unexamined, and all the stronger for its existing below the line
of conscious vision.12
As a narrative enterprise, history engages its readers in a world of
moral choice and constraint. Too often this is little recognized or appreci
ated outside of the ﬁeld of history itself. Philosopher Richard Rorty and
classicist Martha Nussbaum, along with novelist Milan Kundera, celebrate
the power of ﬁction to convey virtues such as empathy, to widen horizons,
and to make us more attuned to the complexity of motivation and con
text.13 Rather than employing the language and concerns of analytic philos
ophy, Nussbaum, for example, brings to the fore questions of classical
philosophy—most notably, ‘‘what does it mean to live a good life?—by
close readings of literary texts. The value of literature and philosophy in
this mode is to open us up to complexity and possibility, rather than to
render moral judgments or presume to occupy a place of neutrality. Unfor
tunately, Nussbaum largely exiles historians from this moral task; she ﬁnds
them narrowly concerned with description and empiricism. When they
work in a moral mode, they simply mimic literature.14 Historians should
demand equal time on the stage of moral narration. After all, historical
narratives are concerned with demonstrating how cruelty and evil are pro
duced, disseminated, and experienced. Reading nuanced and engaged ac
counts of historians about slavery and abolitionism, about war and peace,
about shifting boundaries of gender and race, all of this can be, no less
than in ﬁction, a means of conveying moral meaning to students of history.
Historians will, of course, make judgments, but the impetus behind moral
history should be to trouble issues, to make palatable the pain and necessity
of the moral imagination.15 The hope is that, in the process, historical work
widens vision and cultivates virtues. And this is what morality is all about
for Rorty, Nussbaum, and others.
A heightened concern about the relationship between history and mo
rality began to emerge with particular fervor in the 1980s and early 1990s,
James Cracraft, ‘‘Implicit Morality,’’ History and Theory 43 (2004): 31–42; Elizabeth
Deeds Ermarth, ‘‘Ethics and Method,’’ History and Theory 43 (2004): 61–83.
13
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 141f; Milan Kundera, Testaments Betrayed: An Essay in Nine Parts trans.
Linda Asher (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 215f; Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Lit
erary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), xvi-xvii, 53, 96–97.
14
Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 5.
15
On these issues, see Thomas L. Haskell, ‘‘The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the
‘Age of Interpretation’,’’ Journal of American History 74 (1987): 984–1012.
12
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as academe was caught up in the culture wars and the challenge of postmodern thought.16 Scholars and political ﬁgures debated the nature and
possibility of truth, morality, and cultural purity. Philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre offered the ‘‘disquieting confession’’ that Western culture had
lost its ‘‘capacity to use moral language.’’ He lamented that we exist in a
fallen state of moral decay and confusion.17 Conservatives complained
about the leftist leanings of the liberal arts and about the perceived danger
of moral relativism, in academe and American culture. Allan Bloom’s best
selling The Closing of the American Mind (1987) cried out that Americans
were morally adrift. ‘‘[T]he state of our souls’’ was in danger of sinking,
according to Bloom, because of postmodernism, rock and roll, cultural rela
tivism, and other icebergs in the cold waters of popular culture.18 One-time
Secretary of Education, William Bennett followed hard upon Bloom’s heels
with practical advice about how to resurrect proper moral training and
values. In The Book of Virtues (1993), Bennett offered parents a collection
of texts—almost all drawn from the Western intellectual tradition—that
would arm young people with proper values: courage, perseverance, faith,
loyalty, and honesty, among others.19 These virtues, he felt, were founda
tional, able to withstand the siren song of relativism. Of course, Bloom and
Bennett often preached to the converted, to those who were convinced that
cultural relativism really did exist and that it could only sap the moral life
blood of America.
Liberals fought back. Historian Lawrence O. Levine’s The Opening
of the American Mind (1996) challenged Bloom’s indictment, ﬁnding that
pluralism, attention to race, ethnicity, and gender had had a salutary effect
on the practice and sweep of history.20 Rather than bemoaning the loss of
an artiﬁcial unity, others celebrated the new subjects and perspectives. Lit
erary scholar Gerald Graff found that students ﬂourished in classes when
David Harlan, ‘‘Intellectual History and the Return of Literature,’’ and the response by
David A. Hollinger, ‘‘The Return of the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical Knowl
edge,’’ along with Harlan’s reply, in American Historical Review 94 (1989): 581–626.
17
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (sec. ed., Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 2, 5.
18
Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1987), 19.
19
William Bennett, ed., The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). Also, Bennett, ed., The Moral Compass: Stories for a
Life’s Journey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
20
Lawrence O. Levine, The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture, and His
tory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
16
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teachers challenged them to confront conﬂicting moral and cultural val
ues.21 Richard Rorty, borrowing from traditions of American pragmatism,
philosophical skepticism, and postmodernism, argued that moral values are
particular to cultures, without any ﬁrm foundations other than historical
contingency. Hence, Nietzsche was right: according to Rorty, morals (and
truth) are nothing more than cultural constructions. In arguments concern
ing deeply-held values, there are no knock-out punches to be landed: only
contending views of the world to be accepted or rejected. Although Rorty
made clear that values, even without foundations, were invaluable and
worthy, critics on the right became increasingly alarmed by what they
viewed as a widespread relativism in America.22
Ironically, pluralism, relativism and the critique of historical and scien
tiﬁc objectivity, helped jar open doors for historians with strong religious
convictions.23 A resurgence of American religious history occurred, a turn
that enthused even the most secular of historians. In addition, evangelical
historians began to practice ‘‘believing criticism,’’ not just of the Scriptures
but of history in general.24 Why, some asked, was it acceptable for histori
ans to bring to historical studies Freudian and Marxian perspectives, with
their own metaphysics of necessity, rather than religious views? Increas
ingly, historians no longer hid their religious convictions, and they explicitly
suggested that such convictions could comfortably coexist with their histor
ical research.25 A leading American historian and practicing Mormon, Rich
ard Bushman rejected the view that religious thinkers were more united
than secular scholars in their perspectives. He concluded, in the essay ‘‘Be
lieving History,’’ that ‘‘enlargement of moral insight, spiritual commitment,
and critical intelligence are all bound together.’’26
Secular-minded historians in the 1990s also began to address moral
Gerald Graff, Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conﬂicts Can Revitalize
American Education (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).
22
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979. Also, Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the
American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
23
George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establish
ment to Established Nonbelief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 429–32.
24
Mark A. Noll, Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals, Scholarship, and the Bible in
America (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).
25
But they have not, as Bruce Kuklick argues, been rigorous in their method of examining
religious belief and its empirical claims. Nor is it clear that arguing for postmodernism as
opening up the gates to religion is a useful stance. See Kuklick, ‘‘Evasive Maneuvers,’’
Books and Culture 10 (2004): 21.
26
Richard Bushman, Believing History: Latter-Day Saint Essays, eds. Reid L. Neilsen and
Jed Woodworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 17–18.
21

300

Cotkin ✦ History’s Moral Turn

challenges in an explicit fashion. In 1998 appeared two collections of es
says, In the Face of the Facts: Moral Inquiry in American Scholarship, ed
ited by Richard Wightman Fox and Robert B. Westbrook and Moral
Problems in American Life, edited by Karen Halttunen and Lewis Perry.27
These volumes were linked to the cultural wars that had been raging. Fox
and Westbrook rejected any hint of ‘‘moralism’’ in their call for ‘‘moral
inquiry.’’ They rejected moralism because it sought to recruit historical
facts, at the cost of their complexity, for narrow agendas of political cor
rectness.28 Their volume was predicated upon the pragmatic principle that
values and inquiry cannot be separated, that all scholarship is committed.
In a gloss on Dewey, they announced that ‘‘inquiry is a morally laden set of
practices.’’29 For Halttunen and Perry, acknowledging the advice and prac
tice of David Brion Davis, history was moral examination, attuned to
‘‘moral ironies,’’ steeped in complexity and ambiguity.30 Halttunen and
Perry found that historians could help moral understanding by trying to
ﬁgure out how historical agents had constructed, and been inﬂuenced, by
moral worldviews and practices.
Both volumes sported excellent introductions by well-known histori
ans about the value of moral inquiry in historical study. However, the es
says in Moral Problems in American Life, all written by historians, avoided
conversation with the discipline of philosophy. Indeed, the names of key
moral philosophers such as Kant, Hume, and Rawls, are absent from the
volume. Of ten essays in In the Face of the Facts, only one was by an histo
rian. By and large, the contributions promoted a pragmatic openness to the
varieties, importance, and situated nature of moral perspectives. Historians
were steering toward a moral turn, but they had yet to arrive at it.
The moral turn accelerated after the genocidal bloodletting in Bosnia
and Rwanda, and especially in the aftermath of 9/11. On all sides of the
political divide, questions of value, concerns about the power of belief, and
many other issues entered into the American conscience. Of course, similar
concerns had sprouted, for instance, during the war in Vietnam, as histori
Richard Wightman Fox and Robert B. Westbrook, eds., In the Face of the Facts: Moral
Inquiry in American Scholarship (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Karen Halttunen and Lewis Perry, eds., Moral Prob
lems in American Life: New Perspectives on Cultural History (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998) was, in essence, a Festschrift for David Brion Davis, the esteemed and mor
ally engaged historian of slavery and abolitionism.
28
Fox and Westbrook, eds., In the Face of the Facts, 1.
29
Ibid., 9.
30
Halttunen and Perry, eds., Moral Problems in American Life, 10.
27
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ans and others questioned American foreign policy and reframed the his
tory of American imperialism. But the scope and depth of moral concerns
increased by the 1990s. In literary studies, the cultural turn was a given,
even if there was little consensus as to how to proceed. An ethics of reading
designed to get at the plurality of experience and to comprehend difference
became a moral imperative. 31 Philosophers responded to an epistemologi
cal crisis, deep-seated skepticism, and the inhumanity that refused to exit
the world by using their parsing skills to interrogate events past and future,
and to make judgments on moral issues.
In this vein, moral philosophers Jonathan Glover and A. C. Grayling
examined Allied bombing during the Second World War—area, incendiary,
and atomic—to determine whether it was morally justiﬁed. Grayling, as
well as Glover, presented himself as prosecutor and defender, judge and
jury.32 Grayling begins with a history of Allied bombing of Germany, both
from the perspective of the bombers and the bombed. He offers separate
chapters entitled, ‘‘The Case Against Bombing’’ and ‘‘The Defense of Area
Bombing.’’ He then dons a judge’s robes to decide: the bombing of Ham
burg—as well as Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki by implication—‘‘was
an immoral act.’’ It was ‘‘unnecessary and disproportionate’’ to its goals,
in part, because other means of securing surrender (or changing the means
of surrender) were at hand. Some historians, too, have suggested judgments
along the same lines, by arguing that other options existed, or that the
atomic bombing was necessitated less by military considerations than by
diplomatic ones. But few have been as willing as Grayling to describe in
such an explicit manner that Allied bombing in Germany and Japan was a
‘‘moral atrocity’’ and to suggest that Allied airmen involved in bombing
runs are stained with moral guilt for participating in these actions.33
We obviously need to be wary here. Historical judgments, especially
31
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1999); The Turn to Ethics, eds., Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hans
sen, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (New York: Routledge, 2000), Renegotiating Ethics in
Literature, Philosophy, and Theory, eds. Jane Adamson, Richard Freadman, and David
Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
32
Contra Glover, see Allan Magill, ‘‘Two Para-Historical Approaches to Atrocity,’’ His
tory and Theory 41 (2002): 104–23.
33
A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WW II
Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan (New York: Walker & Co., 2006), 277,
279; Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 84. On the historiography of the bombing, see J.
Samuel Walker, ‘‘Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for a
Middle Ground,’’ Diplomatic History 29 (2005): 311–34.
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rule-based ones, such as the Just War strictures employed by Grayling, can
be deceptively easy to apply.34 They give relatively ﬁrm rules without a suf
ﬁcient sense of tragic moral decisions having sometimes to be rendered.
Moral problems are important because they challenge us to walk down, as
philosopher Thomas Nagel puts it, a ‘‘moral blind alley’’ between absolutist
moral imperatives (in a Kantian sense) and utilitarian calculations of what
needs to be done. The value of historical analysis, joined to philosophical
considerations, is that it highlights the complexity of moral choices, with
out necessarily diminishing responsibility.35
Philosophers agree, in large part, with Grayling’s condemnation of Al
lied bombing, although often in a more nuanced manner. Employing a
blend of historical examples and philosophical analysis, political theorist
Michael Walzer uses Just War theory—with its emphasis on avoiding civil
ian casualties by intent, and by practice. But he is willing to trouble the
issue of Allied bombing in Europe. He refrains from condemning British
area bombing of German civilian centers prior to the end of 1941. In this
period, Great Britain was isolated, without resources to engage Germany
fully in a major land war. In this time of ‘‘supreme emergency,’’ and by dint
of Britain being just in its war aims, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was
justiﬁed in sanctioning bombing attacks that would kill many German
non-combatants. But necessity at this particular historical moment, Walzer
warns us, does not mean that other moral values—the imperative not to
attack non-combatants—are rejected. They are ‘‘overridden,’’ preferably
with a deep sense of tragedy. Or, as philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus notes,
there are situations where agents must choose ‘‘among irreconcilable alter
natives, within the agent’s range of options.’’ A case of ‘‘dirty hands’’ or
‘‘damned if you, damned if you don’t.’’ Yet Walzer, along with other moral
philosophers, contends that later bombing of civilian centers in Germany
and Japan, or the use of the atomic bomb(s), was unjustiﬁed, and hence,
morally wrong.36
G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘‘Mr. Truman’s Degree,’’ (1957) in Anscombe, Ethics Religion
and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 3: 64–65.
35
Nagel, ‘‘War and Massacre,’’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 123–44. In this
same vein, see Susan Wolf’s argument that moral philosophy ‘‘should not serve as a
comprehensive guide to conduct.’’ Wolf, ‘‘Moral Saints,’’ The Journal of Philosophy 79
(1982): 434.
36
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
(2nd. ed., New York: Basic Books, 1977), 246–47. Also invaluable are the writings of
James Turner Johnson, Just War and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical In
quiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). On dirty hands, see Ruth Barcan
Marcus, ‘‘Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,’’ The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 127.
Also, Bernard Williams, ‘‘Politics and Moral Character,’’ in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public
34
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Historians have joined philosophers in taking this moral turn. Harry S.
Stout applies Just War theory to the Civil War and its military campaigns.
Stout demonstrates how a ‘‘moral slide’’ occurs—incremental minor ac
tions lead to a hardening and rationalization of worse atrocities—so that
good intentions birth evil actions.37 In contrast, although eschewing explicit
moralizing in his book on Union actions in the Civil War, Mark Grimsley
shows how the moral baggage carried by Union soldiers in the Civil War
both sanctioned and, more than Stout allows, diminished acts of immoral
ity on the part of Northern soldiers.38
Michael Bess, in a wide-ranging analysis, examines the ‘‘moral dimen
sions of World War II.’’ He concludes, among other things, that the origins
of the war in the Paciﬁc were complex, that racism did undermine moral
sanctions in the Paciﬁc theater (on both sides), and that while the decision
to drop the atomic bomb was ‘‘unequivocally bestial, unconscionable, bar
baric,’’ it did shorten the war and saved lives—both American and Japa
nese.39 Thus an immoral act in terms of Just War theory can, according to
a utilitarian moral calculus, be juggled to be seen as ‘‘profoundly ambigu
ous,’’ and sadly reasonable.40 The title of Bess’s work, Choices Under Fire,
is revealing. It suggests that in war conditions, individuals retain choice in
their actions. While Bess recognizes, as do all historians, that choices are
often constrained by circumstances, individuals still make decisions, opt for
certain courses of action. And, with this imperative for choosing, comes
responsibility. In turn, if agents can choose from a variety of possibilities,
then they are also liable for judgment by historians.
The difﬁculty of arguing against the covering cloak of determinism has
long perplexed philosophers and humanists. An exasperated William James
once exclaimed that even if he could not prove free will, ‘‘my ﬁrst act of
and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 52–74. Rawls,
‘‘Fifty Years after Hiroshima,’’ (1995) in Collected Papers ed. Samuel Freeman (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 565–72. For a contrary interpretation,
see Charles Landesman, ‘‘Rawls on Hiroshima: An Inquiry into the Morality of the Use
of Atomic Weapons in August, 1945,’’ The Philosophic Forum 34 (2003): 21–38, and
Douglas Lackey, ‘‘Why Hiroshima Was Immoral: A Response to Landesman,’’ The Philo
sophical Forum 34 (2003): 39–42.
37
Stout, Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War (New York:
Viking, 2006).
38
Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civil
ians, 1861–1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2, 162, 185.
39
Bess, Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2006), 249.
40
Bess, Choices Under Fire, 246–51.
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free will shall be to believe in free will.’’41 Over the years, the sway of Marx
ian and Freudian concepts, followed by the early work of Michel Foucault
and post-structuralist theory, further threatened to undermine agency and
to sharpen tensions in the concept. Agency was determined by the necessity
of historical development, the demands of the unconscious, or the linguistic
structures of the dominant discourse.42
Such debates about free will are the stock in trade of philosophers and
neuroscientists. But scholars in all disciplines grapple with them. There is
never any consensus about the drag between free will and agency, but we
would do well to stop thinking about it in either/or terms. As anthropolo
gist Michael Jackson sums up the divide, from his Sartrean phenomenologi
cal perspective: we are born into structures of power and culture that
constrain us. But, at the same time, we retain a degree of agency that may
assimilate or change those structures to varying degrees.43
Debates about conduct and agency are at the center of moral philoso
phy, especially in discussions of virtue ethics. Historians would do well to
pay attention to them. Virtue ethics recognizes how the individual is shaped
by rigorous training, by parents or schooling. According to Aristotle,
‘‘Moral goodness . . . [is] the result of habit,’’ the exercise of virtue. We
become virtuous by acting virtuously.44 This emergent self is marked by a
cultivation of virtues, not unlike those enumerated in William Bennett’s
popular volume—patience, charity, courage, to name a few. Training or
disposition determines the identity of the individual. But does possession of
a cultivated moral character undermine the exercise of free will when that
individual is confronted with choices and demanding situations?45
Some individuals helped Jews during the Holocaust, in contrast to the
vast majority of those who remained bystanders or became implicated in
the process of destruction. There is debate about whether or not rescuers
share many traits—religious sentiments, friendships with individual Jews, a
Quoted in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1: 323. Also, George Cotkin, William James, Public Philos
opher (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 61–64. James’s view is in
keeping with many aspects of existentialism, see, Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
42
On the postmodern philosophers, see Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
43
Jackson, Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological Project
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 8ff.
44
Aristotle, The Nichmachean Ethics trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books,
1985), 91.
45
Joel T. Kupperman, Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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particular understanding of humanity. Most importantly, it appears, rescu
ers—at least in later interviews—claim that they acted without thinking
much about what they were doing. Given their own sense of self and their
identiﬁcation with the suffering of others, they simply had to help. They
were, in effect, acting without choice; they could not imagine not helping,
even at the cost of harm to themselves or their families. This is the upshot
of Philip Hallie’s well-known depiction of how villagers, from the town of
Le Chambon, acting under the spiritual guidance of Pastor Andre Pascal
Trocme, willingly shielded Jews. There is a sense that their actions, however
dangerous, were determined by their spiritual and historical situations. If
such was the case, then did they act in full consciousness of choices, or
simply act in accordance with who they were or had become?46
Of course, moral philosophers and psychologists—no less than histori
ans—like to muddy the waters on issues such as choice and free will. Rather
than seeing rescuers as hard-wired to help, some suggest that they were
conditioned to lend a helping hand, initially, in some minor manner (albeit
one fraught with dangers).47 Thus a rescuer might ﬁnd him or herself offer
ing a night’s shelter to a Jew in hiding, a situation that helped the individu
als to bond and that soon stretched out into a longer-term commitment. Or
initial activities in the Resistance, on a relatively low level of danger, might
lead to fuller engagement and greater dangers. Here choices are made, but
only to a degree. A moral ladder, in contrast to a moral slide, suggests that
initial small steps of goodness begin to add up, conditioning the individual
to new ways of acting in the world.48
The self-fashioning of character is appealing, and we see it especially
in historical biography. It is also upheld by William Bennett and others
for its moral valence, promoting the idea that the individual can, through
conscious decision, forge a new character, have it set in stone, and then
confront the world in a consistent and virtuous manner. Hence, in part, the
fascination with Abraham Lincoln. Biographers of Lincoln marvel at how
Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Cambon and
How Goodness Happened There (1979; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1994); Kristen
Renwick Monroe, ‘‘Morality and a Sense of Self: The Importance of Identity and Catego
rization for Moral Action,’’ American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 491–507.
47
An increasingly inﬂuential movement in moral theory situates moral actions within the
context of evolutionary development. James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York:
The Free Press, 1993); Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Sense
of Right and Wrong (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
48
On the complexities of character and decision making, see John M. Doris, Lack of
Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002).
46
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this country boy managed to educate himself, to develop a deep sense of
moral sympathy and a tragic sensibility. The choices that Lincoln made and
the virtues that he cultivated, in the words of one biographer, became his
sense of honor, ‘‘that would make all the difference’’ in his presidency.49
These virtues, it is further argued, helped him to lead during the Civil War,
by holding the Northern coalition together and by promoting a peace with
out undue acrimony.
Rather than character being destiny, perhaps it is but a house of cards
ready to topple under the slightest breeze of circumstance. The relation
between character and contingency, as some philosophers note, is perilous.
Martha Nussbaum speaks of the ‘‘fragility of goodness,’’ stressing how the
Greek fascination with tragedy captures this power to undo virtue.50 Cogni
tive psychologists’ work—some of it quite familiar to historians—casts
doubts about the power of character and identity to uphold virtue. The
famous Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo experiments indicate how
easily subjects jettison moral virtues of empathy and gentleness. The Milgram experiment was simple, although later many variants of it were tried.
In essence, a person designated as a tester was to ask a subject, who was
strapped into what appeared to be an electric chair, a series of questions.
When the subject failed to answer correctly, the tester was to administer an
electric shock. In over 60% of the cases, the tester was willing to deliver
dangerously high voltages of electricity to a person perceived to be scream
ing in pain. Some continued to administer shocks after the subject had
fallen silent or was thought to have dropped dead. This willingness to go
along with the imperatives of the experiment and to follow the commands
of the scientiﬁc authority ﬁgure highlighted how readily people from all
walks of life obey authority. One might protest that such experiments dem
onstrate that character triumphs here as well, given that obedience to con
stituted authority, may be viewed as a virtue. However, many other
Douglas L. Wilson, Honor’s Voice: The Transformation of Abraham Lincoln (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 323. Also, William Lee Miller, Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethi
cal Biography (New York: Knopf, 2002).
50
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19860). On the Greeks as free and
responsible moral agents, see Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: Univer
sity of California Press, 1993). For the ability of character and morality to survive the
worst conditions, see Tzvetan Todorov, Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentra
tion Camps trans. Arthur Denner and Abigail Pollak (New York: Metropolitan
Books,1996); Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). Also, Gaddis, Landscape of History,
116–21.
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experiments, in other situations, indicate that under the pressure of situa
tions, most individuals will act in a way that is discordant with what they
normally recognize as established virtues. In the Zimbardo prison experi
ments, normal university students were given roles to play—prison guards
and prisoners. In short order, the prison guards were administering punish
ment and acting cruelly and the prisoners were suffering real pain. The
experiment had to be terminated early for fear of irreparable mental and
physical harm being inﬂicted.51 If in these controlled experiments individu
als were so quick to shed their moral clothing, then how can historians
lament, or wonder at, the readiness of agents in high tension situations,
such as war, to act in a horrible manner?
Historians and philosophers have important roles to play in examining
the interaction between character and circumstance. Philosophers offer his
torians many critical concepts for examining morality, as well as ﬁne dis
tinctions on the relations between intent and action. But philosophers are
often weak as historians, simply plugging historical events into their theo
ries for illustrative purposes. Indeed, one sometimes senses that philoso
phers might be more comfortable following the method of John Rawls,
who sought to arrive at moral truths by stripping all identifying characteris
tics from his subjects. By imposing a ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ concerning wealth,
race, gender, class, Rawls hoped that he would illustrate an ‘‘original posi
tion,’’ untainted by history and context in order to argue for ‘‘justice as
fairness.’’52
Historians, in contrast to Rawls’ studied ahistoricism and acontextual
ism, immerse themselves in the contingent and essential matters of history.
They refuse to succumb to what Schopenhauer once referred to as ‘‘the
stilted maxims’’ of moral systems that refuse to ‘‘see life as it really is with
all its turmoil.’’53 Historical analysis, description, and interpretation help
us to understand why individuals act and how conscious they are in their
choices. In one of the more compelling examples of this type of history
with great moral implications, Christopher Browning studied the men of
Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (1974; New York:
Harper Perennial, 2004); Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How
Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007). For a historian’s positive
take on Milgram’s concept, see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998),
171–76.
52
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
17 passim.
53
Quoted in Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality,
and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 250.
51
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German Police Battalion 101 during the Second World War. These men,
mostly from the Hamburg area, were emotionally unhardened by ﬁerce
combat, and there is little indication that they were Nazi ideologues, im
bued with rabid anti-Semitism. When told by Major Wilhelm Trapp that
they could opt out of killing at close range thousands of Jewish men,
women, and children, only a small percentage of the troops chose to do so.
The remaining soldiers did their duty and executed Jews—despite what had
to be the horror of killing innocents in a manner that sent blood, bone, and
brains ﬂying everywhere. Browning concludes that whatever virtues and
character these men possessed was trumped by their allegiance to their com
rades and by peer pressure.54
The same moral problem concerning character and circumstance—and
many others—confronts historians studying the My Lai massacre of March,
1968. After disembarking from helicopters, and without encountering any
enemy ﬁre, American soldiers swept through a Vietnamese village popu
lated by mostly women, children, and the elderly. Over a three hour period,
400 people or more were slaughtered, and many women were raped. Some
individuals were brought to ditches and then shot at close range, apparently
under the orders of Lieutenant William F. Calley. He, in turn, maintained
that he had been ordered by Captain Ernest Medina the night before to kill
everything in sight, a chore made easier by his stated conviction that all
Vietnamese were the enemy, or might someday grow up to be the enemy.55
The question ‘‘How could this happen?’’ forces the historian to address
issues about how one constructs a narrative and makes or avoids moral
decisions in analysis.
Novelist and Vietnam veteran Tim O’Brien has written about what
these young soldiers packed with them—letters from home, a family Bible,
rations, good luck charms, and character.56 At My Lai, one of the men was
the son of a minister, but he participated in the slaughter. By any account,
the men involved in the My Lai outrage, like those in the Police Battalion,
were conventionally moral; in normal circumstances they would not have
Browning, Ordinary Men, 160, passim. On ‘‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’’ to propel
and maintain orgies of killing, see Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Execution
ers: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). It should
be said that Goldhagen does act as judge and jury for moral judgments. The style of his
work, including graphic depictions of the slaughter of Jews, bequeaths an added moral
power to his work.
55
On the massacre, see Michael R. Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai
Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley (Lawrence: University Press of Kan
sas, 2002).
56
Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (New York: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1990), 1–26.
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committed any sort of atrocity. How then to approach this issue? Some
argue that these men experienced a moral slide. They had become hardened
by the war (the loss of comrades, frustrated by the seeming invisibility of
the enemy) and sanctioned by the willingness of their ofﬁcers to violate the
rules of warfare by torturing prisoners and acting with disdain towards
Vietnamese civilians. Certainly, few would doubt that these explanations
bring us closer to an understanding of why these young men jettisoned their
moral virtues and engaged in a killing and raping spree.57
Other ways of framing the issue exist. Consider philosopher Thomas
Nagel’s concept of ‘‘moral luck,’’ which contends that it is difﬁcult at best
to imagine what one would do in unfamiliar and harsh circumstances. It is
all-too-easy for us to announce that we would not act as those men did at
My Lai, or that we would have rescued Jews, if in the situation of a German
or Polish citizen. Is it possible that doing the right thing is sometimes actu
ally divorced from intention? Consider Nagel’s well-known illustration of
the contingent nature of morality and the problem of intent. Two individu
als both drive trucks, and both of them know that they should have their
brakes checked. But the brakes seem to be working well enough, and the
drivers have been quite busy of late, so they have neglected to take their
trucks in for inspection. Both of these drivers travel down the same street,
according to the speed limit, on the same night, ﬁve minutes apart. The ﬁrst
driver reaches his destination without incident. Five minutes later, a child
moves suddenly to cross the street, and the second driver, because of his
faulty, unchecked brakes, is unable to stop and kills the child. He is con
victed of manslaughter. However, given moral luck, in what sense can we
conﬁdently presume that he is guiltier in terms of intention than the ﬁrst
driver?58 Concludes Nagel, ‘‘The things we are called upon to do, the moral
tests we face, are importantly determined by factors beyond our control.’’59
Given the circumstances of My Lai, might moral luck come into play? And
to what end?
Perhaps we enter dangerous territory when we try to explain and assess
responsibility for the intentions and actions of the soldiers in My Lai on
that eventful and tragic morning. Does the process of explanation tend to
make the inexplicable seem reasonable? And, if so, does it diminish ac
Glover, ‘‘The Case of My Lai,’’ in Humanity, 58–63.
Thomas Nagel, ‘‘Moral Luck,’’ in Mortal Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), 24–38. Also, Claudia Card, The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral
Luck (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).
59
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countability? This is, quite naturally, a hot-wire issue in trying to explain
evil, such as that of Adolf Hitler or the dimensions of what individuals
did during the Holocaust or Cambodian genocide. Historians must try to
explain, for without such explanation we are be doomed to repeat the
crimes of the past. Yet we must also beware that explanation can be a
way of deﬂecting individual responsibility, of losing either contingency or
character in the welter of explanation.
Given the moral texture of narration, to what degree does the focus of
explanation of Charlie Company’s actions at My Lai direct our attention
away from the suffering of the civilians; does it increase our empathy for
the murderers? Do they become faceless and voiceless, mere effects of the
actions of the soldiers? Do we misplace moral responsibility by focusing on
the grunts on the ground and fail to bring into the picture the moral crimes
of those in positions of power, those who devised the policies of search and
destroy, of body counts, and of free-ﬁre zones? And why, given moral luck,
are these soldiers held more accountable for their crimes than a pilot drop
ping napalm in a civilian-populated area, or an artillery ofﬁcer directing
projectiles into a village where Vietcong may be residing alongside civilians?60
The verdict on character formation, intention, contingency, and judg
ment, then, remains mixed. While character and virtue are useful concepts
for analyzing historical agents and their degrees of free will, these very con
cepts can undermine the thinking process, making agents act in a consistent
but relatively unthinking manner. It tends to make us unaware of the role
that moral luck plays in actions, and it can further place too heavy a burden
on the shoulders of an individual, such as Lieutenant William Calley, who
was thrust into a situation. At the same time, moral luck can tend to dimin
ish the responsibility that Calley must bear—we are, after all, responsible
for what we do, unless compromised by insanity, at least in a legal sense.
We praise certain virtues in due course, but we also need to recognize that
virtues can be content-less.
The soldiers of Battalion 101 or the southern slaveholders may exhibit
many virtues—loyalty to the group, courage to endure difﬁcult acts—but
these virtues are linked to speciﬁc situations. We should not presume, even
when character is formed, that it is resistant to pressures, as cognitive psy
chological experiments uphold. Thus, again, philosopher Thomas Nagel’s
A particularly powerful view of the responsibility of higher ups in the moral horrors of
the war is in Kendrick Oliver, The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 147ff.
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category of ‘‘moral luck’’ comes into play by diminishing the certitude of
judgments that what happened in Vietnam could not have happened to the
chronicler of the event, had he or she been in the same situation. Yet, taking
another moral stance, Tim O’Brien has no hesitancy in condemning the
actions of the My Lai soldiers as immoral and unnecessary. O’Brien be
comes a powerful voice of moral judgment. Many soldiers, he argues, were
in situations similar to Charlie Company’s during the war; they carried
with them the same fraught baggage. Yet they did not kill and rape like
Calley’s men. O’Brien sums up, ‘‘It was murder. There was no punishment.
Something ought to be done about it.’’61 Should historians demur from this
view?
Historians are presently treading upon a landscape full of moral topics.
By stressing how historical memory is constructed and contested, about
how facts are ﬁtted into the garments of memory, historians engage moral
questions. As David Blight puts it in his book on memory of the Civil War,
‘‘Americans made choices to remember and forget their Civil War.’’62 Mem
ory, then, is more than a simple recounting of what happened; it is part and
parcel of national myths, which are moral structures of great importance,
with the potential to heal and fester wounds, to develop an ethic of caring
or dismissal, and to assess or defer blame. German historian Wolfgang Schi
velbusch’s brilliant study of how nations construct memory after defeat in
war is essentially a moral tale of redemption, but at a price—the refashion
ing of historical truth.63 Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit shows how
memory is, in essence, an ethical enterprise, since it can be a form of ‘‘moral
witness.’’ In doing their work at interpreting the past, historians and philos
ophers are part of this moral witnessing process.64 The analysis of memory,
as practiced by historians, is moral in the sense that historians are, in effect,
burdened with a responsibility towards the dead. Historians seek to bring
the dead to life as historical ﬁgures. Thus, one analyst has gone so far as to
suggest something like a Bill of Rights for the Dead!65
The question of empathy is another example of historical work cur
O’Brien, ‘‘Roundtable Discussion,’’ in Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre
ed. David L. Anderson (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 187.
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Toward Past Generations,’’ History and Theory 43 (2004): 130–64.
61

312

Cotkin ✦ History’s Moral Turn

rently under way that partakes of a moral turn. Empathy is certainly a
moral virtue. Historians have linked the development of empathy, begin
ning in the eighteenth-century, with the rise of humanitarian sentiments
and opposition to slavery. As historian Lynn Hunt argues, this movement
towards empathy was, in part, a function of the development of the episto
lary novel, with its ability to communicate the feelings of others. With the
privatization of the body, she further contends, respect for other bodies
increased, which further fed into developing sentiments about human rights
as something universal.66 The question of the relation between empathy and
human rights, especially in the last half century, needs more analysis from
historians. Is it possible, as Susan Sontag and others have argued that empa
thy is deadened when too many images of human suffering crowd our con
sciousness? If so, is empathy threatened with emptiness or in danger of
becoming archaic?
Other questions surround empathy. Has empathy, at least in the last
two centuries, sometimes merged into a mania for experience? Do such
expressions of empathy, when taken to extremes, tend to colonize the indi
vidual with whom one identiﬁes?67 Here I think of Norman Mailer’s wellknown essay, ‘‘The White Negro’’ (1956) as empathy gone wild. Does the
same complaint apply to John Howard Grifﬁn’s sincere transformation—as
recounted in his famous book, Black Like Me—into a ‘‘Negro’’ in order to
experience ‘‘directly’’ their plight in the Jim Crow south?68
The emerging ﬁeld of human rights history further testiﬁes to the will
ingness of historians to engage moral issues and movements. How have
human rights been constructed? How are they limited by the politics of
interventionism? Are universals such as human rights capable of accounting
for the diversity of cultural practices in the world? How can we compare
and deﬁne the genocidal impulses of recent times?69 These are some of the
questions historians of human rights currently address.70
Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,
2007), 35–69.
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Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977) and, in
contrast, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003),
104ff.
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versity Press, 1959), 337–58.
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Finally, and perhaps most controversially, historians are beginning to
meet the challenge of evil.71 How and why might certain acts and institu
tions be properly characterized as evil? Does a concept of evil help or hinder
understanding? Are some events, such as the Holocaust, best left uncharac
terized in terms of evil, lest the designation diminish the cruelty and suffer
ing associated with other horriﬁc events?72 Is evil, by deﬁnition, something
that is ineffable, inexplicable, and hence outside the realm of history?73 Can
historians add to the work of Hannah Arendt, with her conceptualizations
of evil as ‘‘radical’’ and/or ‘‘banal’’?74
Historians can, and should, address moral issues in an explicit manner.
When they choose to pass judgments, they may do so with a sense of limita
tion and humility. As historian Robert Darnton has remarked, historians
can know, ‘‘but imperfectly, through documents darkly, with help from
hubris, by playing God.’’75 Since we, in effect, play God in our interpreta
tions, in the subjects we choose, and in the way we frame our narratives,
the moral turn makes explicit, and more complex, what has too often been
implicit, written under the table.
Historians engaging with the moral turn will beneﬁt from their pluckof Human Rights Politics in the United States,’’ Journal of American History 86 (1999):
1231–50. On links between human rights and the ideals of the New Deal, see Elizabeth
Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2005). Also, Samantha Power, ‘‘A Problem from Hell’’: American and the Age of Geno
cide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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ing the best fruits that philosophers cultivate. In so doing, historical narra
tives can highlight the nuances of intention, the perplexity of choices, the
ubiquity of contingencies, and the complications of character. Some might
charge that these moves will unduly blur the moral vision of our students
and the public. The charge is well taken, in some respects. But in a time
when moral vision is too often presumed to be 20/20, it may be a worth
while corrective. ‘‘All historic virtues and achievements,’’ theologian Reinhold Niebuhr reminds us, ‘‘are more ambiguous and fragmentary, than we
are inclined to believe.’’76
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